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Abstract.
We address the issue of whether public infrastructure play an important role in determining
factor productivity in Italy, and we show that the evidence is mixed.
Publiccapital is significant in explaining output in most cases. However, when the attention
is drawn on the long-run properties of the data, or when care is taken to rule out
contemporaneous short-run effects, then public capital results to be either non-significant,
or significant but of negligible importance. We conclude that the influence of infrastructure
on output is probably due, to a great extent, to short-run demand-side phenomena.
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1      Introduction.
The huge public debt affecting the Italian economy is an obvious reason of concern for
economists and policy makers alike. Jappelli and Ripa di Meana (1990) argue that policies
whose goal is to reduce the debt/output ratio cannot abstract from the role that infrastructure
play in the economy. If infrastructure do influence output significantly, then cutting public
capital investment, by reducing future potential output, could even worsen the problem.
On the other hand, if that is not the case, then policy makers, in a sense, could do without
caring too much on what kind of budget cuts they make, as long as they make them.
The interest in the relationship between infrastructure and output or, more to the point,
factor productivity,however, is not limited to this issue. In theUnited States, muchattention
has been dedicated to the analysis of the causes of the productivity slowdown of the last
two decades. A whole thread of the literature, starting from the seminal paper of Aschauer
(1989), has tried to impute the decline of factor productivity to the decline in public
investment2.
The role played by infrastructure in the economy has been analyzed by a countless number
of works. At a simple and intuitive level, we note that infrustructure affect factor
productivity by "assisting" public capital: a given truck is much more productive on a
freeway, than on a country road. Moreover, new infrastructure embodies technological
progress: to build a brand-new mass-transit system is tantamount to the introduction of a
new technology into a local economy. Infrastructure, also, allows for technological
progress: weren’t roads available at all, we wouldn’t have trucks. At the same time, all
these effects probably take time to manifest themselves, since they involve creation of new
business, relocation of existing activity, and learning3.
The point of interest, obviously, is not whether public capital is significant in determining
productivity, a thesis that very few people, if anybody, would question. What is interesting
to understand is to what extent infrastructure affect productivity beyond its direct provision
of amenities, on one side, and what are the mechanisms that make them influence
production. Both questions have important policy implications. An answer to the first one
2 See Eberts (1990), Munnell (1990), Holtz-Eakin (1994), and Holtz-Eakin and
Schwartz (1994).
3 For a revue essay, also illuminating other points touched by this work, see
Gramlich (1994).
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would help policy makers in choosing the optimal amount of public investment; an answer
to the second one could provide useful guidelines on how to make public investment
succesful.
Using Italian regional data, this work tries to address the first of these two questions. We
try to determine the importance of infrastructure in determining production in the Italian
regions4 over the period 1970-1991. Only very recently the availability of the necessary
data has made this type of study possible for the Italian economy. We conclude that
infrastructure are significant in explaining regional output, but that this is probably due to
the presence of short-run demand-side, as opposed to supply-side, effects.
Section 2, with reference to a few representive works, examines the existing empirical
evidence on the issue, both for the U.S. and for Italy. Section 3 deals with the analysis of
the empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
2      The Existing Evidence.
Aschauer (1989) shows the results of various regressions of different concepts of factor
productivity on factor inputs, including public capital, for the U.S. as a whole. The results
are quite astounding: public capital seems to be highly significant in influencing
productivity, with positive elasticities of around 0.35. Similar results are found by Munnell
(1990a) who, again for the U.S. as a whole, finds elasticities of output with respect to
public capital of comparable magnitudes.
Munnell (1990b) analyses the impact of public capital on productivity using instead a panel
of U.S. state data. The results of her pooled OLS regressions indicate a coefficient for
public capital lower (0.15) than in the time series studies mentioned above, but still highly
significant.
4 Italy is divided into 20 regions, sometimes, for descriptive purposes only, lumped
into five macro-regions.
The regions (and the macro-regions) are: Piedmont, Val d’Aosta, Liguria and Lumbardy
(North-West); Trentino-Alto Adige, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Emilia Romagna
(North-East); Tuscany, Marche, Umbria and Lazio (Center); Abruzzo, Molise, Apulia,
Campania, Basilicata and Calabria (South); Sicily and Sardinia (Islands). South and Islands
together are called the Mezzogiorno of Italy.
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The first wave of works on the topic left the impression that public capital was indeed very
important in determining productivity, and that its decreased growth rates were a prominent
candidate to explain the productivity slowdown that the U.S. economy has experienced in
the last decades.
After a first phase of enthusiasm, however, some caution was asked for by other
less-optimistic results. Holtz-Eakin (1994) criticizes the econometric analysis carried out
by Munnell (1990b), and argues that, in a cross-state analysis of productivity, state specific
effects are potentially important. Holtz-Eakin then rejects the hypothesis that individual
state effects are not relevant and finds evidence against the hypothesis that public capital
plays a role in determining output. The same result also emerges when different
econometric techniques, such as instrumental variables panel estimation and estimation
using long differences of the data, are used.
Holtz-Eakin and Schwartz (1994) take a different approach, and develop a neoclassical
growth model "à la Solow" that incorporates infrastructure as one of the production inputs.
They check whether the data conform to the predictions of their model, and again find
essentially no role for public capital.
Evidence for Italy is scant, due at least in part to lack of the necessary data. Bracalente
and Di Palma (1982) compute a series of indexes to measure infrastructure for the Italian
regions for the year 1977. Using both OLS analysis and rotated-factor regression analysis,
they find that infrastructure are significant in explaining regional development. The
determination of the direction of causality, however, remains an open question in that
work.
Jappelli and Ripa di Meana (1990) estimate a series of reduced-form equations for output,
where both private consumption and public investment are used as regressors. The
estimated coefficients of public capital are significant and bigger than the coefficients of
private consumption; the authors interpret this result as evidence in favor of the hypothesis
that the effect of public capital is important in determining output.
Picci (1994) uses a data set developed by Rossi et al. (1993) and by Picci (1995a) on
aggregate public capital for the post WWII period and for the between-war period, to
estimate a number of regressions similar to the ones considered by Aschauer (1989) and
Munnell (1990). The results generally indicate a significant role for public infrastructure,
with very high output elasticities. This type of analysis permits, to some extent, to address
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the question of the directions of the casual relation between infrastructure and output.
Granger-causation analysis between multifactor productivity (or "Solow residuals") and
the growth rate of public capital gives however ambiguous results, depending on the sample
period considered.
3      The Analysis of Regional Data.
In what follows, we analyze the incidence of infrastructure on output using a recently
developed dataset on regional infrastructure covering the period from 1970 to 1991, for a
total of 22 annual observations. Regional public capital stocks have been computed using
the perpetual inventory technique. The necessary regional public investment time series
have been obtained by apportioning the national aggregate in Rossi et al. (1993) using the
yearly data on "public works" collected by Istat (Istat, various years). The whole procedure
is fairly involved; full details are in Picci (1995a).
Private capital also has been taken from Picci (1995a), where it has been computed using
a benchmark for the regional capital stock for the census year 1981 and regional gross
private investments for the remaining years. Output is regional gross product, and labor
is regional units of labor (source: SVIMEZ (1993); ISTAT (1990a, 1990b, 1992).
Table 1 shows the average growth rate for per capita output, labor units, private and public
capital, together with their beginning- and end-of-sample levels, for Italy as a whole and
for its five macro-regions. The Mezzogiorno (comprising the Southern and the Insular
regions) has a per-capita income much lower than the national average. Convergence has
not occurred over the two decades considered, and the two low income macro-regions
have both scored below-average per-capita income growth rates.
Labor units increased by little and rather evenly across Italy5.
Private capital has increased dramatically, mostly in the Mezzogiorno. In comparison,
public capital has increased by less, whith growth rates of around 3.5% yearly across Italy.
A more detailed break-up of the data would show that most of the increase of the capital
5 However, while in the North of Italy this growth is reflected by a sensible increase
in the ratio of labor units over population, with a more or less constant population, in the
Mezzogiorno population has also grown.
4
stock - both private and public - in the Mezzogiorno occurred during the first part of the
sample period, while the huge effort to industrialize the less-developed Southern and
Insular regions was still ongoing. During the ’80’s, with the dismission of the "Cassa del
Mezzogiorno" (a state agency aimed at the development of the Mezzogiorno), the massive
investments in that part of Italy that had characterized the previous decades came to an
end.
Note that, according to the data, and contrary to intuition, the less-developed Mezzogiorno
has a stock of infrastructure bigger than the two industrialized Northern macro-regions.
Picci (1995b) compares measures of regional infrastructure endowment computed using
perpetual inventory data - let’s call them, "PI" (perpetual inventory) indexes -, with the
indexes in Biehl, Bracalente, Di Palma and Mazziotta (1990), based on the physical
consistency of the capital stock - let’s call them "BBDPM" indexes -. Both indexes are
obtained by deflating regional capital stocks either by regional population - in the case of
"population-serving" infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, etc. - or by regional area -
in the case of "space-serving" infrasructure, such as roads and railroads. A comparison of
the indexes gives some indication on the relative efficiency of the different regions in
producing infrastructure: a PI index higher than a BBDPM index, would show relative
inefficiency in building infrastructure, indicating the presence of little infrastructure in
relation to the amount of resources spent to produce it, and vice-versa.
Picci (1995b), while warning about the risk of drawing hasty conclusions, shows that, in
this respect, there is a very sharp difference between the Mezzogiorno and the rest of Italy:
all the Mezzogiorno regions have PI indexes generally much higher than the BBDPM
indexes. This is particularly true for Campania, Calabria and Sicilia, the three big Southern
regions plagued by organized crime. On the other hand, only Liguria, among the Northern
regions, shows the same carachteristic. This should come as no surprise: Liguria, a
mountainous and densely populated region, is certainly characterized by higher costs in
building infrastructure. For all the other Northern and Central regions, PI indexes are lower
then BBDPM indexes. In other words, there is a case for overestimation of the public
capital stock computed using the permanent inventory technique for Southern Italy in
general, even more so for Campania, Calabria, Sicily, and also for the Northern region of
Liguria. Figure 1 shows both indexes for all regions. The 45 degrees line divides "efficient"
regions (below) from "inefficient" ones (above).
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The empirical analysis is carried out by estimating a production function where public
capital is used in conjunction with private capital and labor input to assess its importance
in determining output.
The estimated equation is:
where is output, is private capital, is labor, is public capital, and denotes
logs. The and subscript indicate, respectively, region and time.
The error term has the following structure:
is a region specific component; is a time specific component, and is a idiosincratic
i.i.d error.
Different specification of the models - and, as we have seen, often different results - follow
from different assumptions about the error term. Not considering gives pooled OLS, the
technique used by Munnell (1990). Holtz-Eakin (1994), in his analysis on U.S. state
productivity, argues that state effects are potentially important. Once he considers them,
he overturns Munnell’s results.
It is important to stress that detecting a significant public capital coefficient does not imply
thatpublic capital causes output. First, the relation could be explained by reverse-causation,
with policy makers responding with increased public investment to better economic
conditions. Moreover, even if infrustructure do influence output, a distinction between
"supply" and "demand" effects should be drawn. It could be that the significant
infrastructure coefficient in the estimated equation is due to its effect on the underlying
determinants of productivity. On the other hand, such a coefficient could result from the
effects of the increased public expenditure on demand. This type of demand effect could
be particularly important in Southern Italy, where the size of public investment, especially
during the first part of the ’70’s, was a considerable fraction of output (see figure 2).
Is there a way to discriminate between these two type of effects? It seems reasonable to
lyrt =  α0 +  α1lkrt +  α2llabrt +  α3lkpubrt +  εrt  , (1)
y k lab kpub l
r t
εit =  fr +  δt +  ηrt .
fr δt ηrt
f
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expect that short-lived demand effects should be detected by analysis that focus on the
short-run time series properties of the data, such as fixed-effects OLS regressions. On the
other hand, long-run supply effects should be detected by focusing on the long run
cross-sectional dimension of the data, for example by estimating long-differences of the
data.
The first and second columns of table 2 show, respectively, results for pooled regressions
and fixed-effects estimates of regional production functions for the Italian regions6. In the
pooled OLS regression results, the estimated coefficient for public capital is embarassingly
negative and significant.
By estimating OLS regressions separetely for the 20 regions (results not reported here but
available from the author), we obtain generally positive and significant estimates of the
public capital coefficients, as in Picci (1994), for the Italian economy, and in Aschauer
(1989), for the US economy. The (unweighted) average of these 20 estimated coefficients,
that tend to be bigger for the Southern regions, is equal to 0.504.
The fixed effects estimates, unlike the pooled OLS estimates, show significant and positive
public capital elasticity. The F-test on the null hypothesis that all fixed effects are equal
(that is, that there are no fixed effects) is strongly rejected. As in Holtz-Eakin (1994) we
are led to conclude that OLS pooled regressions are not consistent. Unlike in Holtz-Eakin,
assuming fixed-effects does not change the results obtained with the aggregate time series
approach. The estimated public capital ouptut elasticities is very high, and comparable to
the results obtained by running separate OLS regressions. Note also that the estimated
labor output elasticity is implausibly bigger than one.
Random effects estimates, shown in column c of table 2, provide similar results. The
Hausman test, however, rejects the null hypothesis that the regional effects are uncorrelated
with the right-hand side variables of the regression. In this case, random effects estimates
are biased, while fixed effects estimates are still consistent.
Fixed effects estimation accounts only for variation in the time series dimension of the
data, and leaves no room for cross-sectional variation. At the opposite end of the spectrum,
OLS regressions on long-differences of the data consider only cross sectional variation.
6 All panel data regressions include time effects.
7
Column d of table 2 shows an OLS regression of the 20 long-differences available.
Long-differences, for each region, have been computed as the differences of the log of the
variables in 1991 with the log of the variables in 1970. The coefficient of labor is still high
and significant, while the coefficient of private capital is still close to zero. The coefficient
of public capital is now also non-significant and with a negative sign.
We are thus confronted with seemingly contradictory results: on the one hand, fixed effects
estimates find significant public capital output eleasticities. Long-differences estimates do
not find any role for public capital. Before we seek an explanation for these discrepancies
in the results, we try to gather more evidence by controlling for the presence of possible
outliers in the data. In the description of the data on public capital, we argued that their
quality may be lower for Southern Italy. We also added that the problem could be
particularly relevant for Calabria, Campania and Sicily, and also for the Northern region
of Liguria.
Column a-c of table 3 shows the same the exercise of table 1, with the exclusion of those
four regions from the sample. The estimates of the public capital coefficient are about the
same as in the previous case, both for panel data and for long differensces estimation.
Columns a,b and c of table 4 show the same exercise, but with the exclusion of the larger
set of possible outliers: the whole of Southern and Insular Italy, and Liguria. Only eleven
regions are left in the sample. The estimated coefficient for public capital is now small,
below 0.2 for the fixed and randomeffects estimates, but still highly signinficant. As before,
formal testing indicates that pooled OLS estimates are not consistent. Long differences of
the data have not been performed for this sub-sample of the data due to lack of degrees of
freedom.
Note that, as we focus our attention on Northern and Central regions only, the magnitude
and the significance of the estimated coefficient for private capital increases. A possible
explanation of this result could be that our data for private capital in Southern Italy also
is of bad quality. Note also that the estimated coefficient on public capital is positive and
significant only when the attention is drawn on the short-run time series properties of the
data, and that it is smaller when the Mezzogiorno is excluded from the analysis. As we
have noted, the Mezzogiorno was characterized by a very high public investment/GNP
ratio, and as such was more likely to be subject to short-run effects of infrastructure on
output. These results are consistent with the presence of short-run demand-side effects of
public capital on output, and with weak (or absent) long-run supply effect.
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As we noted above, a significant publiccapital coefficient could be due to reverse causation.
To control, at least in part, for this possibility, we consider whether lagged public capital
also is significant. If infrastracture are important in determining the long run determinants
of productivity, then they should still be significant once their lagged values are considered.
Also, it is probably reasonable to assume that infrastructure, formed in good part by
networks that take time to be completed, take longer than private capital to become fully
productive, and that for this reason its productive capacities are better proxied by a lagged
value. Good part of the effect of infrastructure on productivity, moreover, should depend
on lengthy processes such as the start-up of new business and the relocation of established
ones.
The results of fixed and random effects estimates for Italy and for the two subsample of
regions are shown in table 5. The estimated coefficients are positive and significant in all
cases. They are small when the whole group of 20 regions is considered, and very similar
to the results of the previous exercise otherwise: around 0.4 when only Calabria, Campania,
Sicily (and Liguria) are excluded from the sample, and below 0.2 when the whole
Mezzogiorno is excluded from the sample.
Reverse causation then does not seem to be the reason for the significant infrastructure
coefficients that have been detected.
In order to consider the possible presence of common trends among the data, we repeat
some of the exercises seen so far using the first differences of the data. Table 6 give the
results for Italy as a whole and for the two sub-sample of the regions. The estimated public
capital coefficients are small and mostly (barely) significant, but their magnitudes are much
smaller than in the previous exercises carried out on the levels of the data. Note that the
estimated coefficients of labor and of private capital are much smaller compared to when
the variables are considered in levels.
As a last exercise, we consider a usual assumption about technology, namely the presence
of constant returns to scale. In our case, we distinguish between constant returns to scale
in the private inputs only ( in equation 1), and constant returns to scale in all
inputs ( in equation 1).
Table 7 and 8 show the results of these two exercises. The estimated public capital output
α1 + α2 = 1
α1 + α2 + α3 = 1
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elasticitiesare very highand significant. F-tests performed on the fixedeffects specification
of the estimated equations, however, lead to reject the hypothesis of constant returns to
scale in both versions at all conventional levels (results available upon request).
4      Conclusions.
We have tried to determine how important was public capital over the ’70’s and the ’80’s
in determining the level of economic activity of the Italian regions.
We have argued that there may be problems in taking at face-value data on public (and
private) capital for Southern Italian regions. For this reason, the analysis has been carried
out on three different groups of regions: the whole group of 20 regions that together form
Italy, the whole group with the exclusion of the three big southern regions of Calabria,
Campania and Sicily and also of Liguria and, last, Northern and Central Italy only (also
with the exclusion of Liguria).
The time series dimension of the data is where short-lived demand-side effects of public
capital on output may be detected. Year-by-year variation of output, determined by
multiplier-like effects of variation of public investments, are good game for fixed- or
random- effects analysis. Such effects, on the other hand, wouldn’t be detected when the
cross sectional variation is privileged in the analysis. In this respect, our analysis is in
accordance with the presence of sizeable demand-side effects. Public capital is significant
in explaining output when fixed effects estimates are used. No effects whatsoever are seen
in the regressions of the long differences of the data.
If the influence of public capital is due to demand effects, moreover, then we should expect
it to be bigger when Southern regions, for which the relative importance of public
investment in the economy is bigger, are included in the sample. This also is in agreement
with the evidence presented above: the estimated public capital coefficient is generally
less important when we restrict our attention to Northern and Central Italy.
Considering public capital lagged one period, to rule out reverse-causation, does not change
the general picture; considering the data in their first differences also shows a (barely)
significant, but now limited, effect of public capital on output.
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We conclude that, analyzing the available data from 1970 to 1991, public capital has had
asignificant effect indetermining output.However, mostof the effect that has been detected
can probably be imputed to the short-run demand-side effects that increased expenditure
has on output.
One last question that needs to be answered is how these results relate with previous
empirical studies of the Italian economy.
The work of Bracalente and Di Palma (1982) does not consider in any way the
time-variation of the variables involved. It simply concludes that, in a given year, regions
with good infrastructure had a good economy. This observation, that could be given many
different explanations, is not in contradiction with the conclusions of this work, and it is
not informative on the magnitude of the effect of public infrastructure on economic activity.
Jappelli and Ripa di Meana (1990) and Picci (1994), on the other hand, consider the time
variationof the data, butwithin an aggregate timeseries context. Their results are confirmed
by the present work. Unlike in Holtz-Eakin (1994), the aggregate time series results here
are not contradicted when the assumption of regional fixed effects is made. They are
contradicted, however, when the cross-sectional dimension of the data is considered.
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Table 1
Summary statistics.
Output per capita N. West N. East Center South Islands Italy
Avg. growth rate: 3.36% 4.04% 3.57% 3.49% 3.16% 3.52%
1970 12.20 10.63 10.36 6.75 7.06 9.66
1991 20.81 19.66 18.12 11.71 11.74 16.80
Per capita output: million of ’85 lire.
Labor Units N. West N. East Center South Islands Italy
Avg. growth rate .38% 1.15% 1.12% .89% .89% .83%
1970 6243.0 3942.0 3829.3 4048.0 1887.0 19949.4
1991 6786.5 4891.5 4726.7 4806.5 2238.6 23449.8
Private Capital N. West N. East Center South Islands Italy
Avg. growth rate 6.35% 5.38% 8.19% 11.78% 9.90% 7.34%
1970 164674.5 125344.0 76512.4 56237.5 35740.2 458508.7
1991 384359.3 267076.8 208139.1 195326.8 110079.0 1164981
Public Capital N. West N. East Center South Islands Italy
Avg. growth rate 3.87% 3.86% 3.06% 3.44% 3.69% 3.56%
1970 72718.0 67924.9 72717.1 103456.1 52944.7 369760.9
1991 131819.2 122936.9 119383.7 178190.3 93955.5 646285.6
Private and public capital: billion of 1985 lire.
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Table 2
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
Italy.
Variable: a) OLS b) F.E. c) R.E. d) L.D.
Constant 2.445 - .200 .453
(21.63) (1.28) (3.98)
Private Capital .248 .097 .145 .011
(20.76) (7.81) (12.59) (.293)
Labor .863 1.080 .737 .807
(49.41) (18.79) (39.13) (3.56)
Public Capital -.063 .430 .355 -.012
(-4.15) (15.51) (14.58) (-.08)
.993 .945 .948 .459
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. P-Value: .000
OLS: Pooled OLS;
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
L.D.: Long Differences.
t-statistics are between parentheses.
R2
H0
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Table 3
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
Italy excl. Cal, Camp, Sic, Lig.
Variable: a) OLS b) F.E. c) R.E. d) L.D.
Constant 2.184 - .134 .512
(17.21) (.81) (2.95)
Private Capital .224 .088 .126 .012
(18.46) (6.47) (9.98) (1.27)
Labor .849 1.22 .758 .789
(45.21) (18.58) (32.16) (2.39)
Public Capital -.005 .413 .374 -.090
(-.26) (13.68) (14.04) (-.48)
.994 .945 .951 .438
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. P-Value: .000
OLS : Pooled OLS;
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
L.D.: Long Differences.
t-statistics are between parentheses.
R2
H0
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Table 4
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
North and Center excl. Lig.
Variable: a) OLS b) F.E. c) R.E.
Constant 1.151 - .197
(7.78) (1.52)
Private Capital .200 .390 .418
(11.80) (16.67) (20.91)
Labor .700 .846 .588
(31.53) (13.48) (26.56)
Public Capital .236 .171 .178
(9.37) (6.61) (7.27)
.997 .977 .991
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. P-Value: .019
OLS : Pooled OLS;
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
t-statistics are between parentheses.
R2
H0
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Table 5
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
Public capital is lagged one period.
Italy Italy excl. Cal, North and
Camp, Sic, Lig. Center excl. Lig.
Variable: a) F.E. b) R.E. c) F.E. d) R.E. e) F.E. f) R.E.
Constant - 1.623 - .117 - -.018
(13.42) (10.41) (-.143)
Private Capital .246 .279 .102 .154 .418 .447
(17.62) (21.42) (6.25) (10.41) (16.32) (20.70)
Labor 1.342 .832 1.196 .738 .810 .553
(20.38) (38.83) (18.40) (31.69) (12.54) (24.29)
Lagged Public Capital .013 .013 .410 .359 .179 .192
(3.26) (3.12) (12.77) (13.02) (6.66) (7.48)
.919 .944 .945 .953 .977 .981
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000 .000 .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. .000 .000 .038
P-Value:
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
t-statistics are between parentheses.
R2
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Table 6
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are first differences of logs.
Italy Italy excl. Cal., South and Center
Camp., Sic, Lig. exc. Lig.
Variable: a) b) c) d) e) f) g) h) i)
OLS F.E. R.E. OLS F.E. R.E. OLS F.E. R.E.
.014 .007 - .008
Constant .014 .158 .014 .015 - (4.17) (1.45) (1.60)
(4.34) (2.00) (4.16) (4.26)
Private Capital .011 .013 .013 .017 .021 .017 .060 -.179 .011
(.55) (.486) (.558) (.80) (.77) (.81) (.74) (-1.46 (.12)
Labor .542 .524 .534 .529 .506 .526 .546 .487 .527
(9.79) (9.16) (9.97) (8.47) (7.90) (8.42) (6.47) (5.52) (6.20)
Public Capital .120 .158 .136 .083 .129 .089 .073 .211 .108
(1.78) (2.00) (1.98) (1.20) (1.64) (1.27) (1.07) (2.56) (1.51)
.622 .623 .626 .659 .670 .661 .784 .797 .459
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .568 .279 .072
H. Test: FE vs. RE. P-V: .999 .999 .999
OLS : Pooled OLS;
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
H. Test: Hausman Test.
t-statistics are between parentheses.
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Table 7
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
Constant returns to scale in the private inputs .
Italy Italy excl. Cal, North and
Camp, Sic, Lig. Center excl. Lig.
Variable: a) F.E. b) R.E. c) F.E. d) R.E. e) F.E. f) R.E.
Constant - -.068 - .102 - .198
(-.404) (.584) (1.48)
Private Capital - - - - - -
Labor .908 .844 .922 .853 .594 .585
(72.69) (76.92) (66.45) (70.84) (24.71) (33.21)
Public Capital .472 .300 .484 .291 .203 .182
(19.37) (16.31) (17.86) (15.15) (8.09) (11.73)
.960 .947 .958 .944 .887 .893
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000 .000 .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. .000 .000 .905
P-Value:
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
t-statistics are between parentheses.
α1 + α2 = 1
R2
H0
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Table 8
Dependent variable: Gross Regional Product.
All variables are in logs.
Constant returns to scale in the private and public inputs .
Italy Italy excl. Cal, North and
Camp, Sic, Lig. Center excl. Lig.
Variable: a) F.E. b) R.E. c) F.E. d) R.E. e) F.E. f) R.E.
Constant - 2.07 - 2.190 - 1.425
(27.36) (25.76) (18.96)
Private Capital - - - - - -
Labor .439 .593 .457 .623 .384 .420
(17.22) (27.52) (15.55) (25.57) (18.21) (20.02)
Public Capital .436 .216 .433 .197 .138 .117
(13.47) (8.45) (11.73) (6.95) (4.86) (4.26)
.947 .930 .945 .953 .867 .849
Test:  : no FE. P-Value: .000 .000 .000
Hausman Test: FE vs. RE. .000 .000 .002
P-Value:
F.E.: Fixed Effects;
R.E.: Random Effects;
t-statistics are between parentheses.
α1 + α2 + α3 = 1
R2
H0
21
Figure 1
                 High Investment / Low Capital Stock           High Investment / High Capital Stock
                 Low Investment / Low Capital Stock           Low Investment / High Capital Stock
Public Investment and Infrastructure.
The regions are:
North-West: Piedmont (PIE), Val d’Aosta (VAA), Liguria (LIG) and Lumbardy (LOM);
Noth-East: Trentino-Alto Adige (TAA), Veneto (VEN), Friuli-Venezia Giulia (FVG) and
Emilia-Romagna (ER);
Center: Tuscany (TOS), Marche (MAR), Umbria (UMB) and Lazio (LAZ);
South: Abruzzo (ABR), Molise (MOL), Apulia (PUG), Campania (CAM), Basilicata
(BAS) and Calabria (CAL);
Islands: Sicily (SIC) and Sardinia (SAR).
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Figure 2
NW: North-West;
NE: North-East;
C: Center;
S: South;
I: Islands.
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